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AVAILABLE POST-TRIAL RELIEF AFTER A STATE
CRIMINAL CONVICTION WHEN NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES "ACTUAL INNOCENCE"
Judge Josephine Linker Hart*
Guilford M. Dudley"
I. INTRODUCTION TO A"PARADE OF HORRIBLES"
One can hypothesize a "parade of horribles" in which a person
stands convicted of a capital crime, and after exhausting post-conviction
remedies, is executed, only to have the results of a DNA test incontro-
vertibly establish the deceased's innocence. For another egregious
example, assume the State proves through seemingly indisputable
evidence that the defendant committed murder, and yet, subsequently,
the "victim" reappears or perhaps a murder conviction is based on
eyewitness identification or a confession, but, after trial, a videotape is
discovered showing another person committing the crime. We need not,
however, dwell purely in the hypothetical. Nationwide, eighty-five
death-row inmates (or more than one percent of the approximately 6000
men and women sentenced to death since the United States Supreme
Court reinstated the death penalty in 1976) have been released from
prison after their convictions were "overturned by evidence of inno-
cence."' In that same period, 610 people have been executed; thus,
approximately one innocent person is sentenced to death for every seven
executed.2 A former Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice, who
previously had been both a prosecutor and homicide detective, was
quoted as saying there was "no question" that Florida had executed
persons who were not guilty of the crime for which7 they were con-
demned.3
Undoubtedly, most Arkansans believe that a rational society would
not acquiesce to a system of laws permitting incarceration or execution
* Judge, Arkansas Court of Appeals; LL.B. 1971, University of Arkansas School
of Law. The authors thank Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender, Sixth Judicial
District of the State of Arkansas, for his editorial and substantive recommendations.
** Law Clerk to the Honorable Josephine Linker Hart; J.D. 1986, University of
Arkansas School of Law.
1. Alan Burlow, The Wrong Man, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1999, at 68; see also
BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE xvii (2000); 146 CONG. REC. S 198 (daily ed.
Feb. 1, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
2. See 146 CONG. REC. S198 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy);
see also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at 218 (collecting similar statistics). Innocent
persons served an average of seven and one-half years on death row. See 146 CONG.
REC. S198 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
3. See 146 CONG. REC. S198 (daily ed. Feb. , 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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of innocent persons, and they are unlikely to accept the proposition that
ourjurisprudence provides no remedy for innocent persons wrongfully
imprisoned. However, in Arkansas, a person with newly discovered,
incontrovertible proof of actual innocence, discovered post-trial, has
limited judicial recourse. If this new evidence is not presented to the
courts within a very short time, that person will be unable to secure his
release.4
For the purposes of this article, a claim of "actual innocence" is a
claim of factual innocence; that is, the defendant did not commit the
crime for which he was convicted.' Actual innocence may be estab-
lished by exculpatory evidence that cannot be reconciled with a
conviction.6 For instance, actual innocence may be established by the
offender providing a corroborated confession which does not implicate
the defendant as an accomplice.' Also, it may be established by
physical evidence that exculpates the defendant For example, the
availability of new scientific tests, such as DNA testing,9 could establish
that a person was innocent of rape and murder."0
One such case is that of Ronald Jones," upon whom the circuit
court of Cook County, Illinois, imposed the death penalty after a jury
found him guilty of murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault. 2
4. This commentator lists Arkansas as one of the few states that "do not provide
review for bare innocence claims made by death-sentenced prisoners several years after
trial." See Michael J. Muskat, Note, Substantive Justice and State Interests in the Aftermath
of Herrera v. Collins: Finding an Adequate Process for the Resolution of Bare Innocence
Claims Through State Post-conviction Remedies, 75 TEX. L. REV. 131, 159 n. 123 (1996).
5. See Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims
After Herrera v. Collins, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 489 n.I (1998).
6. See J. Thomas Sullivan, "Reforming" Federal Habeas Corpus: The Cost to




9. The Arkansas Supreme Court discusses at length the history of DNA testing
in Praterv. State, 307 Ark. 180, 191-96, 820 S.W.2d 429,434-37 (1991). However, the
method described in Prater, restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP), has been
supplanted by a more sensitive test, polymerase chain reaction (PCR). See NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS xiv-xv, 1, 28 (1999); SCHECK ET AL., supra
note I, at 35-40.
10. Citing a Justice Department report, this writer notes that 2,012 primary
suspects in 8,048 rape and rape-and-murder cases referred to the FBI from 1988 to mid-
1995 were exonerated by DNA evidence. See Burlow, supra note 1, at 74.
11. See People v. Jones, 620 N.E.2d 325 (III. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1012
(1994).
12. See id. at 328.
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The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence, 3
approving the trial court's admission of questionable modus operandi
evidence 4 and Jones's confession." At trial, Jones denied any involve-
ment and asserted that his confession had been coerced by the police.'6
Subsequently, the development of sophisticated scientific testing
allowed authorities to analyze the DNA in the small amount of sperm
that had been collected from the victim. 7 The Illinois Supreme Court
reversed a lower court and permitted additional testing. As a result,
Ronald Jones was released from his death sentence on May 17, 1999,
because the DNA test results from the sperm sample established that it
was not his semen.18
Ronald Jones became the twelfth inmate released from Illinois's
death row in a twelve-year period. 9 At the time, Jones was the sixty-
fourth person in the nation to be exonerated by DNA evidence after
conviction.-0 On January 31, 2000, Illinois Governor George H. Ryan
declared a moratorium on executions and announced that he would
appoint a commission to review the Illinois capital-punishment system.2'
Governor Ryan noted that since the reinstatement of the death penalty
in Illinois in 1977, twelve death-row inmates had been executed while
thirteen had been exonerated.22 In contrast, the Arkansas Supreme Court
recently denied a request for DNA testing,23 and Arkansas Governor
Mike Huckabee stated that there would not be a similar moratorium on
executions in Arkansas.24
13. See id. at 339.
14. See id. at 330-3 1.
15. See id. at 332.
16. See id. at 329.
17. See Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Yet Another Death Row Inmate Cleared. CHI.
TRIB., May 18. 1999, at I.
18. See id. SCHECK ET AL., supra note I. at 220.
19. See Mills & Armstrong, supra note 17, at 1.
20. See Mills & Armstrong. supra note 17, at 1: SCHECK ETAL.. supra note I, at xv.
21. Wo Pnss Releaes (visited Feb. 20,2000) <hlp./Avww.sail.tstgDov Jan/l .
22. See id.
23. See Pitts v. State, 336 Ark. 580, 986 S.W.2d 407 (1999). The Arkansas
Supreme Court denied relief even though Pitts had unsuccessfully filed two clemency
petitions. See id. at 584 n.1, 986 S.W.2d at 410 n.1.
24. See Huckabee Defends Process Leading to State 's Executions, ARK. DEM.GAZ., Feb.
26, 2000, at 12A. The article further noted that Arkansas has executed twenty-one men
since the United States Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in 1976. See id.
Ten were executed during the current administration, seven during Jim Guy Tucker's
administration, and four during Bill Clinton's administration. See id. According to the
article, Governor Huckabee also commuted a sentence to life imprisonment the day
before the execution of one man. Bobby Fretwell, was scheduled to occur. See id.
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In Arkansas, the means to obtain post-trial relief after a criminal
conviction include a motion for new trial, direct appeal, a petition for
state habeas corpus relief, a petition for relief from an illegal sentence,
a petition for relief under Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a petition for writ of error coram nobis, a petition for federal
habeas corpus relief, and clemency petitions to the executive branch.
This article evaluates the extent to which Arkansas's post-trial proce-
dures allow prisoners to present to circuit courts newly discovered
evidence of actual innocence and obtain relief from a death sentence or
a sentence of imprisonment. This article concludes that either because
the nature of the relief provided by these procedures is limited, or
because of the brief time frame within which one must petition for
relief, all post-trial procedures provide little opportunity for a prisoner
to establish his or her actual innocence through newly discovered
evidence. This article also suggests possible reforms to enable prisoners
to prove that newly discovered evidence establishes their actual
innocence.
!1. AVAILABLE RELIEF
A. Motions for New Trial
Newly discovered evidence is the least-favored ground for the
granting of a new-trial motion. To prevail on a motion for new trial, the
movant must show that the new evidence would have changed the
outcome of his case and that he used due diligence in trying to discover
the evidence before trial.25 Denial of a new-trial motion is reversed only
for an abuse of discretion.26 A claim of newly discovered evidence must
be addressed to the trial court in a motion for new trial made within the
time to file a notice of appeal.2'7 This period is thirty days.28 Thus, but
25. See Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 478, 915 S.W.2d 702, 717 (1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 898 (1996).
26. See id., 915 S.W.2d at 717.
27. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.3 (Michie 2000). The rule provides that "[a] person
convicted of either a felony or misdemeanor may file a motion for new trial, a motion
in arrest of iudgment, or any other application for relief, but all motions or applications
must be filed prior to the time fixed to file a notice of appeal." Id.
28. See ARK. R. APP. P.-CRIM. 2 (Michie 2000). The rule provides in part:
(a) Notice of appeal. Within thirty (30) days from
(I) the date of entry of a judgment, or
(2) the date of entry of an order denying a post-trial motion under Ark. R.
Crim. P. 33.3, or
(3) the date a post-trial motion under Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.3 is deemed denied
632 [Vol. 22
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for a fortuitous finding of newly discovered evidence within thirty days
after entry of judgment, a person's claim of actual innocence would
most likely be untimely.29
B. Direct Appeal
A defendant cannot argue on direct appeal that newly discovered
evidence establishes his actual innocence." A challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence provides a means to allege that the State
failed to place substantial evidence of one or more elements of the
charged offense before the factfinder.3" In Walkerv. State,3" the Arkansas
pursuant to subsection (b)( I ) of this rule; or
(4) the date of entry oftan order denying a petition for post-conviction relief
under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37,the person desiring to appeal the judgment or
order or both shall file with the trial court a notice of appeal identifying the
parties taking the appeal and the judgment or order or both being appealed.
Id.
29. Thirty-three states require that claims of innocence based on new evidence be
brought within six months of the final appeal. See SCHECK ET AL., supra note I, at 218.
Just seven states permit tile motion to made at any time. See id.
30. See Wilson v. State, 277 Ark. 43, 50, 639 S.W.2d 43, 49 (1993).
31. Rule 33.1 of the Arkansas Rules ofiCriminal Procedure, adopted April 8, 1999,
provides:
(a) In a jury trial, ifa motion for directed verdict is to be made, it shall be
made at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution and at the close
of all of the evidence. A motion for directed verdict shall state the specific
grounds therelor.
(b) In a nonjury trial, if a motion for dismissal is to be made, it shall be made
at the close of all of the evidence. The motion for dismissal shall state the
specific grounds therefor. If the defendant moved for dismissal at the
conclusion of the prosecution's evidence, then the motion must be renewed
at the close of all of the evidence.
(c) The failure of a defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at
the times and in the manner required in subsections (a) and (b) above will
constitute a waiver or any qtestion pertaining to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the verdict or judgment. A motion for directed verdict
or Ior dismissal based on insufficiency of the evidence must specify the
respect in which the evidence is deficient. A motion merely stating that the
evidence is insufficient does not preserve for appeal issues relating to a
specific deficiency such as insufficient proof on the elements of the offense.
A renewal at the close of all of the evidence of a previous motion for
directed verdict or for dismissal preserves the issue of insufficient evidence
for appeal. If for any reason a motion or a renewed motion at the close of all
of the evidence for directed verdict or for dismissal is not ruled upon, it is
deemed denied for purposes of obtaining appellate review on the question of
the sufficiency of the evidence.
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.1 (Michie 2000).
32. 314 Ark. 628, 864 S.W.2d 230 (1993).
2000] 633
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Supreme Court clearly established its position to challenges based on
new evidence, stating that:
As a final point, we emphasize once more that we will not remand a
case in order for an appellant to gamer more information to bolster his
posture on appeal. Unlike some of our sister states, in Arkansas we
entertain only one appeal from a final judgment or order which
completely disposes of all issues involving all parties. It is incumbent
upon the appellant to present a case before the trial court which fully
and completely develops all issues.3
C. Petition for State Writ of Habeas Corpus
Another avenue of post-trial relief is the petition for a state writ of
habeas corpus. One recent Arkansas Supreme Court decision discusses
the writ in detail.34 As noted in that opinion, the Arkansas Constitution
provides that "[tihe privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, except by the General Assembly, in case of rebellion,
insurrection or invasion, when the public safety may require it."35 There
is a statutory procedure to follow to obtain habeas corpus relief. 6 The
court has recognized that the writ of habeas corpus is appropriate when
a person is detained without lawful authority.37 However, the court
narrowly interpreted the scope of habeas corpus relief, permitting
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus only if the commitment was invalid
on its face or the committing court lacked jurisdiction." In determining
whether the denial of a writ of habeas corpus was proper, the court will
look for invalidity only on the face of the commitment order. 9 Proof of
actual innocence would neither establish that a commitment was invalid
on its face nor show that the committing court lacked jurisdiction, and,
therefore, would not be addressed in state habeas corpus proceedings.'
33. See id. at 633, 864 S.W.2d at 233 (internal citation omitted).
34. See Renshaw v. Norris, 337 Ark. 494,497-99,989 S.W.2d 515,517-18 (1999).
35. See id. at 497, 989 S.W.2d at 517; ARK. CONsr. art. II, § II.
36. See ARK. CODEANN. § 16-112-101 to -123 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2000).
37. See Renshaw, 337 Ark. at 497, 989 S.W.2d at 517.
38. See id. at 498, 989 S.W.2d at 517.
39. See Cleveland v. Frazier, 338 Ark. 581, 587, 999 S.W.2d 188, 191-92 (1999).
As an example, a judgment of conviction and order of commitment is facially invalid
when thejudge lacks color ofauthority to execute the judgment and order. See Waddle
v. Sargent, 313 Ark. 539, 855 S.W.2d 919 (1993).
40. See James W. Gallman & James D. Storey, Comment, Relief by Federal Habeas




D. Petition for Relief from an Illegal Sentence
According to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111, '
petitioners may have an illegal sentence corrected at any time and may
have a sentence imposed in an illegal manner corrected within ninety
days after the sentence is imposed or within sixty days after receipt by
the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or
dismissal of the appeal.42 The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, has
concluded that this statute conflicts with its court rules, and that
consequently, the petitioner must raise all grounds for post-conviction
relief from a circuit court imposed sentence pursuant to Rule 37 of the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.43  Thus, section 16-90-I I
provides no relief to prisoners claiming actual innocence."
E. Petition for Rule 37 Relief
While Rule 37 relief includes a claim that either trial or appellate
counsel was ineffective, the scope of Rule 37.1 is much broader,
including claims that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution and laws of the United States or of Arkansas, that the court
imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction to do so, that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law, or
that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack."5 Thus, Rule
41. ARK. CODE ANN. §16-90-111 (Michie Supp. 2000).
42. See id. Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-1Il provides as follows:
(a) Any circuit court, upon receipt of a petition by the aggrieved party for
relief and after the notice of the relief has been served on the prosecuting
attorney, may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided in this
section for the reduction of sentence.
(b)( I) The court may reduce a sentence within ninety (90) days after the
sentence is imposed or within sixty (60) days after receipt by the court of a
mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal.
(2) The court may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of probation as
provided by law.
Id.
43. See Taylor v. State, 324 Ark. 532, 922 S.W.2d 710 (1996).
44. The statute may still be used to modify illegal conditions of probation. See
Reeves v. State, 339 Ark. 304, 310, 5 S.W.3d 41,44 (1999).
45. See ARK. R.CRIM. P. 37. 1. Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 provides
in part:
A petitioner in custody under sentence ofa circuit court claining a right to
be released, or to have a new trial, or to have the original sentence modified
on the ground:
(a) that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution and laws
20001 635
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37 manifests the petitioner's constitutional, statutory, and other rights
to subject a sentence to collateral attack.46 While Rule 37 does not
provide a method for the review of "mere error" occurring at trial or
serve as a substitute for direct appeal, "errors that are so fundamental as
to render the judgment of conviction void and subject to collateral
attack" may be raised in Rule 37 proceedings.47 The Arkansas Supreme
Court recently stated that post-conviction proceedings under this rule are
intended to "avoid" unjust imprisonments and enable the courts to
correct a "manifest" injustice.48 However, the time limits within which
to pursue relief are short.49
of the United States or this state, or
(b) that the court imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction to do so; or
(c) that the sentence was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by
law; or
(d) that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack: may file a
verified petition in the court which imposed the sentence, praying that the
sentence be vacated or corrected.
Id.
46. See Cigainero v. State, 321 Ark. 533, 534, 906 S.W.2d 282, 283 (1995): see
also Chisum v. State, 274 Ark. 332, 333, 625 S.W.2d 448, 449 (1981).
47. See Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375,383-84,993 S.W.2d 901,906 (1999); see also
Kennedy v. State, 338 Ark. 125, 129,991 S.W.2d 606,608 (1999) Collins v. State, 324
Ark. 322, 326, 920 S.W.2d 846, 848 (1996).
48. See Bohanan v. State, 336 Ark. 367, 369, 985 S.W.2d 708, 709 (1999).
49. See ARK. R.CRIM. P. 37.2. Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.2 provides
in part:
(a) If the conviction in the original case was appealed to the Supreme Court
or Court of Appeals, then no proceedings under this rule shall be entertained
by the circuit court while the appeal is pending.
(b) All grounds fbr relief available to a petitioner under this rule must be
raised in his or her original petition unless the petition was denied without
prejudice. Any ground not so raised or any ground finally adjudicated or
intelligently and understandingly waived in the proceedings which resulted
in the conviction or sentence, or in any other proceedings that the petitioner
may have taken to secure relief from his or her conviction or sentence, may
not be the basis for a subsequent petition. All grounds for post-conviction
relief from a sentence imposed by a circuit court, including claims that a
sentence is illegal or was illegally imposed, must be raised in a petition
under this rule.
(c) I'a conviction was obtained on a plea of guilty, or the petitioner was
found guilty at trial and did not appeal the judgment ofconviction, a petition
claiming relief under this rule must be filed in the appropriate circuit court
within ninety (90) days of the date of entry of judgment. If the judgment was
not entered of record within ten (10) days of the date sentence was
pronounced, a petition under this rule must be filed within ninety (90) days
of the date sentence was pronounced.
If an appeal was taken of the judgment of conviction, a petition claiming
relief under this rule must be filed in the circuit court within sixty (60) days
of the date the mandate was issued by the appellate court. In the event an
636 [Vol. 22
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But again, Rule 37 does not provide for direct attacks upon
judgments in criminal cases.50 A motion seeking a new trial on the basis
of newly discovered evidence is a direct attack on the judgment, not a
collateral attack.5' Thus, the Court has concluded that under Rule 37
newly discovered evidence is not a proper basis for relief.
52
One case in particular drives this point home. Danny Sanders was
convicted of aggravated robbery and rape after two victims, Roger and
Bonita Hughes, provided the only evidence against him." Both
identified Sanders at trial as one of four men involved.54 Sanders's
convictions were affirmed on appeal." Subsequently, Sanders sought
post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 37.56 In the Rule 37 proceeding,
Sanders provided an affidavit from Roger Hughes asserting that Sanders
was not one of the four men involved, despite Hughes's testimony to the
contrary at trial.57 Hughes's affidavit further provided that Bonita
Hughes had stated that Sanders was not the individual who sexually
assaulted her.58 Sanders also provided an affidavit of Jackie Don Britt
in which Britt stated that he, and not Sanders, was the person who
sexually assaulted Bonita Hughes. 9 Britt also identified the four
individuals who robbed the Hugheses and repeatedly asserted that
Sanders was not involved.6" A verified statement taken from Britt
confirmed the information in the affidavit and provided a detailed
account of the actions of the four men on the night in question.' A
report of a polygraph examiner provided by Sanders stated that Sanders
answered truthfully when he denied being at the Hugheses campsite and
appeal was dismissed, the petition must be filed in the appropriate circuit
court within sixty (60) days of the date the appeal was dismissed. If the
appellate court affinns the conviction but reverses the sentence, the petition
must be filed within sixty (60) days of a mandate following an appeal taken
after resentencing. If no appeal is taken after resentencing, then the petition
must be filed with the appropriate circuit court within ninety (90) days of the
entry of the judgment.
Id.
50. See Cigainero, 321 Ark. at 534, 906 S.W.2d at 283.
51. See id. at 535, 906 S.W.2d at 283-84.
52. See id., 906 S.W.2d at 284.
53. See Sanders v. State, 291 Ark. 200, 201, 723 S.W.2d 370, 370-71 (1987).
54. See id., 723 S.W.2d at 371.
55. See id., 723 S.W.2d at 370.
56. See id., 723 S.W.2d at 370.
57. See id., 723 S.W.2d at 371.
58. See id., 723 S.W.2d at 371.
59. See Sanders, 291 Ark. at 201, 723 S.W.2d at 371.
60. See id., 723 S.W.2d at 371.
61. See id., 723 S.W.2d at 371.
2000] 637
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sexually abusing Bonita Hughes.62 Additionally, Sanders provided a
report of an investigator concerning interviews with various people who
established an alibi for Sanders. 6' Finally, Sanders outlined the physical
discrepancies between himself and the person Bonita Hughes described
as her assailant.' The Arkansas Supreme Court noted the credibility of
the supporting evidence but nevertheless denied the petition, concluding
that it constituted a direct attack on a judgment for which Rule 37 was
not intended.65 The court further stated:
While we must deny the petition for the reasons stated, we are
constrained to express our belief that the petition presents a meritori-
ous case for reopening, that Danny Sanders's conviction was the
result of mistaken identification. For that reason we regard the matter
as an appropriate appeal for clemency and we commend it to the
executive branch as facially worthy of serious consideration.6
On January 14, 1988, then-Governor Bill Clinton commuted Sanders's
sentence to time served. 67  Although the Court concluded that, in
essence, Sanders was actually innocent, he was not relieved of his
felony conviction.
F. Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis
According to the Arkansas Supreme Court, the writ of error coram
nobis is a "legal procedure to fill a gap in the legal system-to provide
relief that was not available at trial because a fact exists which was not
known at that time and relief is not available on appeal because it is not
in the record.16' The court has further stated that "[t]he writ is allowed
only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to address
errors of the most fundamental nature.'" 9 Yet, despite this assertion, the
court has limited the scope of the writ of error coram nobis. Newly
discovered evidence is not in itself a basis for issuance of a writ." The
writ is available to address errors in four categories: insanity at the time
62. See id. at 202. 723 S.W.2d at 371.
63. See id. at 201, 723 S.W.2d at 371.
64. See id., 723 S.W.2d at 371.
65. See Sanders, 291 Ark. at 201, 723 S.W.2d at 371.
66. See id. at 203, 723 S.W.2d at 372.
67. State of Arkansas Executive Department Proclamation (Jan. 14, 1988) (on file
with authors).
68. See Penn v. State, 282 Ark. 571, 573-74, 670 S.W.2d 426, 428 (1984).
69. See Brown v. State, 330 Ark. 627, 630, 955 S.W.2d 901, 902 (1997).
70. See Pitts v. State, 336 Ark. 580, 582, 986 S.W.2d 407, 409 (1999).
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of trial, a coerced guilty plea, material evidence withheld by the
prosecutor, or a third-party confession to the crime made between
conviction and direct appeal.7 The courtjustified the limitation of the
writ regarding newly discovered evidence in the form of a third-party
confession as follows:
[Tihe questions of fact which invariably accompany an allegation of
a third-party confession demand prompt scrutiny. The mere fact that
another person has confessed to a crime cannot, alone, be grounds for
relief for such confessions are not uncommon and must be ap-
proached with some skepticism. The trial court must carefully
scrutinize the corn plete circumstances surrounding the confession and
all the available evidence. Assessing the merits of the third-party
confession requires that all of the evidence be available and unim-
paired by the passage of time so that the trial court's examination can
be exhaustive and decisive. Our requirement that such a claim be
raised before affirmance serves to limit such claims to the time frame
in which it is most likely that the trial court can determine with
certainty whether the writ should issue. Assertions of a third-party
confession after a judgment is affirmed may be addressed to the
executive branch in a clemency proceeding.7 2
The court also discussed the limits of the writ of error coram nobis
in a capital murder case where the petitioner sought leave to proceed in
circuit court because DNA analysis, which was unavailable at his trial
in 1979, was now available to test a hair sample the State introduced
into evidence.7" The petitioner contended that the results of the DNA
test would refute the State's expert witness testimony that hair found on
the victim was like his hair.74 The court stated:
Where there was no fundamental error at the time of trial, newly
discovered evidence is not a cause to issue a writ of error coran? nobis.
The mere fact that over time a scientific test may have been devel-
oped which did not exist at the time of a petitioner's trial is not in
itself cause to issue the writ because the development in scientific
testing cannot establish a fundamental error made at trial. A peti-
tioner who contends that newly developed scientific testing can
exonerate him should submit the allegation to the executive branch in
a clemency proceeding.75
71. See id. at 583, 986 S.W.2d at 409.
72. See Brown, 330 Ark. at 632, 955 S.W.2d at 902-03.
73. See Pitts, 336 Ark. at 583, 986 S.W.2d at 409.
74. See id., 986 S.W.2d at 409.
75. See id. at 584, 986 S.W.2d at 409-10 (internal citation omitted).
2000] 639
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This reasoning is suspect. Even though advances in scientific
testing cannot establish a fundamental error, the results of a new
scientific test can do so. The court's reasoning makes sense only if the
imprisonment of innocent persons is not a "fundamental error."'76
Nevertheless, the writ of error coram nobis provides a narrow
window of relief for petitioners who claim that newly discovered
evidence in the form of a third-party confession has established their
actual innocence.' The writ can also serve as a powerful tool in the area
of prosecutorial misconduct.T
G. Petition for Federal Habeas Corpus Relief
The opportunity for a state prisoner to obtain review of a claim of
actual innocence is also limited in federal court. The United States
Supreme Court has held that claims of actual innocence based on newly
discovered evidence do not state a ground for federal habeas corpus
relief without an independent constitutional violation occurring in the
course of the underlying state criminal proceedings.79 This conclusion,
the Court stated, "is grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts
sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the
Constitution-not to correct errors of fact."" ° The Court further stated,
"Few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to
provide for federal habeas review of freestanding claims of actual
innocence."'" The Supreme Court, however, held out a slim possibility
of relief for state prisoners sentenced to death, stating as follows:
We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that
in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual inno-
cence" made after trial would render the execution of a defendant
unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no
state avenue open to process such a claim. But because of the very
disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would
have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous
76. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, POST-CONVICTION
DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS 9-10 (1999). It should be
noted that unlike third-party confessions, the probative value of DNA evidence does
not diminish over time. See id.
77. See Gallman & Storey, supra note 40, at 427-28.
78. See Larimore v. State, 327 Ark. 271, 281, 938 S.W.2d 818, 822-23 (1997).
79. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1993).
80. See id. at 400.
81. See id. at 401.
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burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would
place on the States, the threshold showing for such an assumed right
would necessarily be extraordinarily high.82
Thus, if a state prisoner's claim of actual innocence does not satisfy
these requirements, he or she is without a remedy in federal court."3
H. Executive Clemency
A prisoner may also petition for clemency, a power vested in the
governor. 4 Clemency, however, has been described as arbitrary,
lacking both systematic rules and appellate review, and subject to the
whims of the governor's personal preferences and the political pressures
borne by him. Furthermore, the governor is likely without the funding
necessary to properly investigate a clemency petition." It is noteworthy
that one previous Arkansas governor who was a firm opponent of the
death penalty commuted the sentences of fifteen men on death row only
at the end of his term in office.8 6 Given the political pressures to which
a governor may be subject, it is doubtful that executive clemency can
save all prisoners who are actually innocent.
82. See id. at 417.
83. See id. United States Senator Leahy of Vermont noted that the United States
Supreme Court "could not even make up its mind whether the execution of an innocent
person would be unconstitutional." 146 CONG. REC. S199 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2000)
(statement of Sen. Leahy). Further, it should be noted that under the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a person sentenced to death under state law
must bring his habeas petition within six months of the state court's affirmance of his
conviction and sentence on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. §2263(a) (Supp. 1997). For cases
in which the person did not receive a death sentence, there is a one-year limitation. See
Marcia Coyle, Law: Innocent Dead Men Walking? New Habeas Law Would Have Sealed the
Fate of Some Inmates Later Found Not Guilty, NAT'L L.J., May 20, 1996, at A l, A20. The
time limitations are tolled during the pendency of petitions for state post-conviction
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), 2263(b)(2) (West. Supp. 1999); see also SCHECK ET
AL., supra note 1, at 218-19; 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), 2263(a) (Supp. 1999).
84. See ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 18.
85. See Henry Pietrkowski, Note, The Diffusion of Due Process in Capital Cases of
Actual Innocence After Herrera, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV 1391, 1426-30 (1995).
86. See Winthrop Rockefeller, Executive Clemency and the Death Penalty, 21 CATH.
U. L. REV. 94 (1971) (editor's note).
87. According to the Arkansas Governor's Office, in 1997, 556 applications were
denied and 30 were granted. In 1998, 763 applications were denied and 24 were
granted. This information is on file with the authors.
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I1l. VARIETIES OF REFORM
A. Legislative Reform
If executive clemency does not provide adequate redress for
prisoners with post-trial claims of actual innocence, then an appropriate
remedy to vindicate such claims must be developed. One possible
solution is state legislative reform. However, without some powerful
constituency to press for legislative change, it is doubtful that any such
measure would be brought before the Arkansas General Assembly, let
alone be enacted. For forty years, warnings of this gap in our criminal
justice system have been unavailing."8
Reform, however, may come at the federal level with regard to
claims of actual innocence based on new DNA testing. On February 10,
2000, United States Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced the
Innocence Protection Act of 2000,89 which would prohibit states from
denying an inmate's request for DNA testing of biological material that
could produce new exculpatory evidence or from denying an inmate a
meaningful opportunity to prove their innocence using the results of
DNA testing.' The bill further allows inmates to enforce these
provisions through declaratory or injunctive relief.9' In addition, the
bill requires that before the State may receive federal grants for DNA-
related programs, it must create procedures by which biological
materials are preserved and DNA testing is made available to its
inmates.92 Whether this bill will survive to be enacted into law remains
to be seen.
B. Expansion of Existing Extraordinary Writs
Another possible solution is to expand the scope of the state writs
of error coram nobis and habeas corpus to permit the circuit courts to
hear actual-innocence claims. It is apparent, however, that the Arkansas
Supreme Court has declined to expand the scope of these writs despite
88. See John H. Haley, Comment, Coram Nobis and the Convicted Innocent, 9 ARK.
L. REv. 118, 128 (1955); See also Gallman & Storey, supra note 40, at 431-32.
89. See S. 2073, 106th Cong. (2000).
90. See id. § 104(a)(1)-(b).
91. Seeid. § 104(c).
92. See id. § 103.
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warnings that Arkansas criminal procedure provides no remedy to
prevent the execution or continued imprisonment of innocent persons. 93
C. Relief Through State Constitutional Provisions
Possibly, a prisoner might seek relief based on a state constitutional
provision. For instance, one might pursue an untimely motion for new
trial, arguing that based on Herrera, such time limitations, as applied to
actual-innocence claims, violate the state (or even federal) constitution.94
It is unlikely, however, that state constitutional arguments grounded in
due process95 or claims of cruel and unusual punishment" would
persuade the Arkansas Supreme Court to grant relief, given the United
States Supreme Court's apparent rejection of arguments based on these
grounds in Herrera.97 Also, it is unlikely that the Arkansas Supreme
Court would interpret state constitutional provisions more broadly than
its identical or nearly identical federal counterparts." Nevertheless,
Herrera suggests that habeas corpus relief is available when there is a
truly persuasive post-trial demonstration of actual innocence and no
state avenue open to process such a claim. This suggestion implies that
some constitutional provision mandates the hearing of post-conviction
claims of actual innocence. 99 It is noteworthy that seven members of the
United States Supreme Court were amenable to the possibility that a
93. See Haley, supra note 88, at 128-29; see also Gallman & Storey, supra note 40,
at 431-32.
94. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE, POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING
REQUESTS 16 (Sept. 1999) (citing Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway of
Innocence for Death-Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943,
1012-15 (1994)).
95. See ARK. CONST. art. i, § 8.
96. See id. §9.
97. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 405-11; see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 493.
98. See Wilson v. City of Pine Bluff, 278 Ark. 65, 66, 643 S.W.2d 569, 569-70
(1982) ("When the language of the federal and state constitution is identical, as in the
instance of the confrontation clause, the due process clause, and several others, and
there is no reason for us to construe our constitution other than in the same way as the
federal constitution has been construed, we take the view that the case presents a
federal question, not a state one .... "); see also Smith v. State, 340 Ark. 116, 119-20,
8 S.W.3d 534, 536 (2000) (interpreting the confrontation clause in the state and federal
constitutions to provide identical rights); Kellar v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 339 Ark.
274, 279, 5 S.W.3d 402, 405 (1999) (interpreting the ex post facto clause in state and
federal constitutions identically).




claim of actual innocence could merit judicial relief in death cases."°
Thus, interpretation of our state constitution may reveal a constitutional
requirement for hearing claims of actual innocence in circuit court.
There are other provisions in our constitution which might permit
prisoners to bring claims of actual innocence.' For instance, the
Arkansas Constitution provides that "[e]very person is entitled to a
certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs he may receive in
his person . .."" The broad wording of this provision might enable
a prisoner with a claim of actual innocence to petition for relief in circuit
court.
D. Promulgation of Rules by the Arkansas Supreme Court
The Arkansas Supreme Court could promulgate court rules
governing claims of actual innocence. The court's rule-making powers
derive from the state constitution, which specifically grants the court the
power to "make rules regulating the practice of law...." ,, 3 The court
has previously promulgated rules governing post-conviction procedures.
It did so in 1965, after the United States Supreme Court held that the
states must provide some avenue of post-conviction relief for
prisoners."° If, as at least suggested by Herrera, the opportunity to
assert a claim of actual innocence is constitutionally mandated, the court
should promulgate rules permitting such claims to be heard.
Any such procedure must address several considerations. First, the
court must determine the level of proof that will establish a claim of
actual innocence.' °  Possible standards include proof beyond a
reasonable doubt,"c° clear and convincing evidence,'07 and proof that the
100. See Berger, supra note 94, at 1008; See also Muskat, supra note 4, at 143.
101. See ARK. CONST. art. II.
102. See id. § 13.
103. See id. amend. 28.
104. See Jack A. McNulty, Comment, Post-Conviction Relief in Arkansas, 24 ARK. L.
REV. 57, 65-66 (1970).
105. See Phaedra Tanner, Note, Herrera v. Collins: Assuming the Constitution
Prohibits the Execution ofan Innocent Person, Is the Needle Worth the Search?, 1994 UTAH
L. REV. 1283, 1315-17 (1994) (identifying the various standards); See also Muskat,
supra note 4, at 177-79 (identifying the various standards).
106. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 429 (White, J., concurring); See Anderson, supra note
5, at 510-14 (discussing Texas state law); See also Muskat, supra note 4, at 180-85
(advocating this standard but modifying Justice White's formulation).
107. See Pietrkowski, supra note 85, at 1438-40 (advocating adoption of this
standard); See also Anderson, supra note 5, at 506-10 (discussing Connecticut state law).
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petitioner is probably innocent or probably would not be found guilty.'0 8
Second, the court must decide whether the petitioner must sustain a
burden of pleading or production in an application for an evidentiary
hearing before actually receiving a hearing."° Third, the court must
determine whether such an initial application should be reviewed either
by the trial court or by the supreme court itself, which would then
determine whether an evidentiary hearing would be held. Fourth, the
court must decide whether the petitioner's claim is subject to a time
limitation"0 and whether he must exercise some sort of diligence".. or
lack of actual knowledge in discovering the evidence. "2 Fifth, the court
must decide whether relief must be granted to petitioners who are guilty
of capital murder but could establish that they were not qualified for the
death penalty." 3 Finally, the court must set forth procedures for
retaining DNA evidence, providing the petitioner with access to it for
testing, and determining who will test the DNA and pay for the
testing."4
IV. A SOMBER CONCLUSION
There is no remedy in the Arkansas criminal court system which
permits prisoners to make claims of actual innocence based on newly
discovered evidence if such a claim falls outside the narrow limitations
of existing remedies. The federal writ of habeas corpus may or may not
provide a remedy for such claims. Executive clemency is an inadequate
108. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at442 (Blackmun, J., concurring); See also Muskat, supra
note 4, at 179, n. 214. See also Anderson, supra note 5, at 501- 04 (discussing Illinois
state law).
109. See Tara L. Swafford, Note, Responding to Herrera v. Collins: Ensuring That
Innocents Are Not Executed, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 603, 628-29 (1995) (suggesting
that the petitioner should bear the burden of proof and that in his application for an
evidentiary hearing the facts be viewed in the light most favorable to him with that
presumption disappearing once the application for an evidentiary hearing is granted);
See also Muskat, supra note 4, at 172-76 (recommending a similar bifurcation).
110. See Berger, supra note 94, at 1017-18.
111. See Pietrkowski, supra note 85, at 1440; See also Anderson, supra note 5, at
516-18; See also Berger, supra note 94, at 1018-19.
112. See Swafford, supra note 109, at 629.
113. See Swafford, supra note 109, at 629-30.
114. See S. 2073, 106th Cong. § 102 (2000); See also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
HANDLING REQUESTS 10 (Sept. 1999) (noting that New York (N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
440.30(1-a) (McKinney Supp. 1999-2000)) and Illinois (725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-3
(West Supp. 1999)) have statutes specifically authorizing post-conviction DNA
testing). Illinois, with fourteen, and New York, with seven, also have the most
exonerations based on DNA evidence. See also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at 262.
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remedy. Given the likelihood that the legislature will not act in this
area, the Arkansas Supreme Court should provide prisoners who are
actually innocent the opportunity to establish their innocence. Other-
wise, in time, Arkansas will accept a shocking injustice: innocent
persons will serve sentences of imprisonment or be put to death despite
the discovery of new evidence that could prove their innocence. And so
long as the innocent are imprisoned or executed, the guilty are at large,
safe in the knowledge that others are serving their sentences.
